Egypt is expecting an extra 200Million standard cubic feet of gas per day (MMscf/d) via pipeline from Israel by the end of June 2026.
The new 46 kilometre Ashdod-Ashkelon pipeline, operated by Israel Natural Gas Lines (INGL), is an additional stretch of transportation facility from offshore Israel, to ease bottlenecks in that country’s southern gas pipeline network and increase the capacity of the offshore East Mediterranean Gas (EMG) pipeline from around 650MMscf/d to 850MMscf/d.
Still another 400MMscf/d is supplied through the more circuitous Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) that is also used to supply Jordan with around 300MMscf/d. The AGP route is also being expanded. Completion of compressors at Rehab in northern Jordan in the second half of 2026 will increase AGP flows by around 400MMscf/d.
All of these mean that overall Israeli-Egypt export through both the EMG and the AGP systems should reach as high as 1.3Billion cubic feet per day (1.3Bscf/d), in time for the peak gas demand season.
Italian contractor, Saipem, says it has delivered the gas recovery module for the Bouri Gas Utilization Project (BGUP), to the project site offshore Libya.
“Weighing more than 5,200 tonnes and measuring approximately 45 metres by 31 metres, with a height of around 45 metres, the module was built in about two years, and integrates advanced gas treatment systems, and it has been installed on the existing offshore platform at the Bouri field, contributing to the development of the new infrastructures foreseen by the project”, the company notes in a statement.
Saipem utilised Saipem 7000, one of its largest crane vessels, to complete the lifting operations of the module.
The Bouri Gas Utilization Project, developed by Mellitah Oil & Gas (a joint venture between ENI and NOC), aims to recover associated gas currently subject to flaring, the controlled combustion of excess gas that produces the typical flame visible in refineries or wells, and transport it to the Mellitah complex for use or export..
Saipem is the main Engineering, Procurement, Construction, and Installation (EPCI) contractor for the Bouri project, but Rosetti Marino fabricated the module at its Marina di Ravenna yard on Saipem’s behalf.
“In early May, the module left the yard to be transported to the Bouri field, located approximately 170 kilometres off the Libyan coast”, Saipem says in the release.
“The lifting of the module marks a major milestone in the execution phase of the project, confirming Saipem’s ability to manage complex operations through advanced engineering planning and the use of heavy-lifting solutions, in full compliance with the highest standards of safety and reliability”, Saipem states.
Saipem’s next activities on the project, to be execute by Rosetti Marino, include the integration of the module on the existing DP4 platform, as well as hook-up and commissioning of the plant and its related communication, safety and control systems. In addition, pre-commissioning activities are planned for approximately 28 kilometres of already laid subsea pipelines, which connect the DP3, DP4 and Sabratha platforms and will enable the transportation of the recovered gas to the Mellitah treatment complex.
ExxonMobil is looking to exploit a significant volume of gas when it develops its Owowo and Bosi fields, whose sanctions are both a heavy work in progress.
“Part of Owowo’s delivery is a gas pipeline”, says Jagir Baxi, Lead Country Manager of ExxonMobil Nigeria and its affiliates. “If we are successful to FID (Final Investment Decision), it will be gas to shore. But Bosi in its complexity is another step forward from where Owowo is”.
He said the company would “like to be able to get to 100Million cubic feet of gas per day also from Owowo.
“So there is gas there. It has more gas compared to Usan or Erha, so it is valuable that we try and monetize it together with doing the oil development”.
Baxi said the Bosi accumulation is a much more oil and gas development than Owowo, although it is farther down the years from development than Owowo. “It means that the nature of the investment infrastructure is fundamentally different and more involved. Bosi will need a pathway for gas handling from day one”.
Baxi was fielding questions by three journalists from as many publications in his office, located in Ikoyi, on the edge of the Lagos Lagoon.
ExxonMobil’s plan for Usan field redevelopment has been widely published in the media. Baxi has also been quoted as describing the Owowo project as the tip of the company’s ‘growth spear’. The discovery of the Owowo field, in 600 metres of water, was announced in October 2016. A development drilling campaign, planned to commence by January 2020, was kicked further down the road when the Nigerian government passed a new law: the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract (PSC) Amendment Act (November 2019), which the project’s partners deemed to have weakened the project’s commerciality. Now, 10 years after the announcement of its discovery Owowo is very close to happening…
Excerpts from the interview by AKPELU PAUL KELECHI
One of the most consequential things about the proposed Owowo field development is that it doesn’t come with a new Floating Production Storage & Offloading (FPSO) facility?
The lead concept is a tie-in and it’s because it is within the technical boundary of being able to do a tie-back. It’s a step out, but it’s within a global experience envelope. Usan is available, it has capacity. It is largely the kind of FPSO that Owowo needs to develop.
Conceptually, a new FPSO at Owowo would come with more capital expenditure CAPEX. And more CAPEX means the investor group will seek to recover their capital through the production of Owowo, which would mean fewer barrels for the state, either in revenues or taxes or profit sharing to government. So when we look at Owowo, we also use this phrase “competitive deepwater oil for development,” meaning it achieves a capital basis that is the most optimal, which is a tie-back. An investment that is higher CAPEX for whatever reason, in a production sharing contract environment, the investors will recover that because the capital must get recovered. That’s not necessarily good; a lower CAPEX equals more of the production barrels available to share. Investors will share some of that, but so will many others. So I don’t want to be lazy about our capital investments. It has to be the right capital efficient development for Owowo. Usan provides that opportunity and the partners in Owowo are the same partners in Usan, so there is a natural environment to capitalize on what’s available at Usan.
Jagir Baxi: “We want to mature Bosi in this 5-year horizon. I cannot tell you today where that notable FID might occur, but we will invest to mature it as fast as we can”
If it is this easy to take advantage of the Usan infrastructure, why is it taking so long?
I don’t want to leave you with the impression that this is that easy. It is at the very edge of global experience for deep water development. So it is challenging in that sense and it’s challenging in terms of going from the idea of Owowo to Usan and then to translate that to an engineered solution that we can bank. We, meaning all of us, the investor group, the government, and the stakeholders can bank for what is hopefully more than two decades.
The journey of Owowo to the point where FID is the visible announcement, goes back at least two years. We have been on the journey to utilize the data of Owowo exploration and appraisal with reprocessing of that data and seismic with the most modern capability that exists in industry today. We did that through 2021 and 2022.
It underpinned the field development plan (FDP) update that we submitted to Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) and that they approved. From there, we have been working and inspired by this administration’s enabling announcements through 2024. I’m referring specifically to Presidential Executive Directives 40, 41, 42, on national content and contract.
The journey since the FDP for Owowo was approved, has been to take each one of those directives, translate them to project specific outcomes. So for example, national content directive translates to an Owowo specific national content strategy. The directive on contracting and efficient cycle time of contract translates to an Owowo contracting strategy. And the incentive structure translates to an Owowo incentive analysis. That’s been the journey of our work since our divestment concluded.
So it’s 15 or 16 months. That’s the kind of time horizon it’s taking.
15 or 16 months since our divestment because we have been public about the fact that we needed the shallow water and deep water separation to occur so that we could bring our best attention to the deep water and we have. Think about Owowo at the $7 to $8Billion range plus. I come back to Usan at $1Billion, Bonga North at $5Billion. We’re now in the $8Billion plus range as a measure of the complexity of step up. But in order to make an announcement that we can all stand behind, the maturity of all the thinking that has to occur is in flight.
We hope to be able to point to the formative announcements of formative agreements like long lead procurement, like establishing shore based capability to support that project. These will be the visible early signals before FID. just like we did with Usan. So there’s a lot that occurs today that are within the stakeholder groups enabling the presidential inspiration. Each of those will reach a milestone that will underpin more visible commitments. That’s the journey we’re on. So when we make an FID announcement, we do it with the partners clearly aligned with us, the stakeholders clearly aligned. It’s a signal to go.
We’re not interested in making an announcement that looks like we want to go. We want certainty, we’ll work for certainty, and we’ll commit to what we say we will do as operator and we’ll do it with them. That’s the reputation we want to continue with.
One of the directives that were issued in 2024 was the incentive structure. And it has enabled Owowo to be more globally competitive. But ExxonMobil is not looking for hand-outs. What we want is to be able to bring our best which is highly competitive cost and schedule because that will create more value of the resource for more stakeholders, not just for the investor group.
The incentives that the president has codified, and is continuing to support, brings another level of improved ability to invest. It takes all three of those and I’m not interested in taking advantage of just one. I want to bring our best as an investor by capitalizing on contracting and national content along with incentives. We want to do our best on capital to project to cost efficiency. Then we will all win.
“The incentive structure accounts for gas explicitly today, that hasn’t been the case before. The nature of Owowo and Bosi requires top-tier global contracting partners. Those partners are more interested to return and invest in Nigeria today.”
What’s the current cost of production per barrel for these three assets? What’s the global benchmark?
There’s no single number that I can point you to. Life cycle matters in these deepwater developments. Early in the life of the developments, cost of production is naturally low but the investors have put large capital up front. As assets age, technology becomes obsolete, a greater amount of maintenance of floating structures, subsea structures have to happen, cost tends to go through waves. Bonga and Erha are now in the window where the industry asks the question, how do I extend the life of this FPSO for another cycle? 20 to 25 years, I want another cycle. So there’s another wave of investment and cost will come with that. What I can say is that Nigeria’s deep water operations that we participate in are able to be competitive. There is an inherent extra cost burden in Nigeria, to be transparent. It does exist. It’s also one of the reasons why one of the presidential orders was incentivizing cost performance in order to achieve greater return for the industry. That signals an intent to help pull cost down.
In terms of Nigeria being a developing country environment in which large capital investments have to occur, the fact that there is a cost delta to other climates, other environments, is not itself an issue. I don’t want you to leave with a view that I see that as an issue. It’s not.
Bringing the very best of global capability that ExxonMobil can bring is also about bringing our best capability to bring costs down.
Given the investment chronology, your “tip of the spear” should be the ongoing Usan development, not Owowo which is farther down the line
We use this phrase for Owowo because it is a true green field development. We use the concept of tip of the spear because there are more developments that are following it. Our own next operated opportunity is Bosi. Then we are heavily invested and supportive of our partner development in Bonga or Bonga Southwest because we have a 20% share in Bonga and that’s of interest for us. In a sequence of the spear piercing the next horizon of deep water development, we see Owowo as the one we can bring. We see Bosi as the second one that we can bring, and we want to support the success of Bonga Southwest.
So Bosi is a higher priority for you than Bonga Southwest?
No, it’s better to look at it in terms of technical maturity and readiness. Owowo and Bonga Southwest are more similar in readiness terms. Bosi is less ready in terms of its overall technical maturity. The reason for that is important to understand.
Unlike Bonga and Owowo, Bosi is a much more oil and gas development, not a primarily oil development. It means that the nature of the investment infrastructure is fundamentally different and more involved. Today Erha doesn’t have and doesn’t need a pathway for gas handling. But Bosi will, from day one.
Owowo scope will bring gas outlet for Owowo and Usan. So part of Owowo’s delivery is a gas pipeline. If we are successful to FID, it will be gas to shore. But Bosi in its complexity is now from where Owowo is another step forward.
It is really bigger than Owowo, multiple times bigger in terms of the span of that reservoir resource. In the geology, there are more geological areas for Bosi than Owowo. And its proximity to Erha…
When you say there are more geological reservoirs…
Yes there are more reservoirs where the oil and gas is accumulated, there are more reservoirs. But in terms of a net basis, Bosi is bigger. Bosi is bigger than Owowo, but it has more gas than it has oil.
But you’ve never done any gas project in the country at all
Not in the deep water. We have in our shallow water days.
But even that was a struggle. You really haven’t been keen on the gas business in Nigeria.
No, and the conditions have always been more challenging. And in the deep water, it is challenging.
Is that going to slow down Bosi? Is that why Bosi has been on the back burner for 25 years?
It has struggled from a number of areas. Gas and gas development value chain is one of those. But we can see a path that’s a bit more clear today. The incentive structure accounts for gas explicitly today, that hasn’t been the case before.
The nature of Owowo and Bosi requires top-tier global contracting partners. Those partners are more interested to return and invest in Nigeria today. ExxonMobil will not be able to make Bosi a reality without that added capacity.
And then the ability to utilize the contracting and national content directives today is more enabling than it’s been historically. So we can see a clear path for Bosi. The technical maturity is not as ready as Bonga Southwest or Owowo, so it naturally will come behind. But it needs more work on the gas side than the other two have needed so far. There’s a journey of development for Bosi that is going to take the kind of time horizon we’ve talked about here.
Does this means that Bosi is not going to happen for another 7 or 8 years?
No, we are motivated to make it happen sooner than that. But in terms of major announcements, there is a journey still to go. The same journey we’ve talked about on the others, we still have to walk that journey together with our partners. So your questions started with tip of the spear. This is what I would like you to take away: there are three large important developments that we are a part of to which we are leading.
And we want to create the space and certainty that contracting can lift all three. National content can lift all three. The incentive structures can lift all three. Bosi has a specific need which is how do we maximally develop the gas at a scale that is not being done in deep water yet in Nigeria?
An artist’s rendering of the two Esso Nigeria’s FPSOs
What’s ExxonMobil’s five-year outlook in Nigeria?. Both Usan and Erha are roughly doing around 102,000 barrels now. And with this Usan infill, that will roughly go to 130,000. Are you seeing a possibility of 250,000 in the next 5 years? If indeed Owowo takes FID this year, which is unlikely…
You’re absolutely right about the numbers. The Usan and Erha operations today accumulate a little over 100,000 barrels.
We also want to support about the same amount that Bonga is producing because that’s important for us as a shareholder and for the country. Usan’s infill programme should unlock, we expect somewhere up to 40,000 barrels. That is almost a doubling of flowing capacity in Usan.
And for the Erha infill programme, we estimate somewhere around 20,000 barrels with what we can see today. We hope to be able to grow that. And then for Owowo, our view is that it can produce over 100,000 barrels at peak. So to your question about can we see a future of 250,000 or 200,000 barrels per day at peak? Yes, it is definitely a possibility as we put these investment pieces together.
I mentioned that the Owowo project comes with an expectation of a gas pipeline that can unlock gas from Owowo and Usan to shore. So 250,000 barrels liquids, we’d like to be able to get to 100Million cubic feet of gas per day also from Owowo underpinned by Owowo. So the horizon has that kind of possibility.
It has more gas compared to Usan or Erha, so it is valuable that we try and monetize it together with doing the oil development. So we are incentivized with the partner group to bring gas from the hub of Erha and Owowo to shore.
That’s the development path that gets us to 200K plus and some valuable amount of gas. In a five year horizon. Beyond that, we want to mature Bosi in this five-year horizon. I cannot tell you today where that notable FID might occur, but we will invest to mature it as fast as we can.
“In terms of Nigeria being a developing country environment in which large capital investments have to occur, the fact that there is a cost delta to other climates, other environments, is not itself an issue”
Can we have clarity on partner alignment on Bonga Southwest, because the narrative out there was that ExxonMobil was the stumbling block. That you have nowaligned and we’re looking at Bonga Southwest taking FID in, say, August 2026?
Let me talk a little bit about Bonga Southwest because I appreciate the narrative that exists. Allow me to at least express our partner view on Bonga Southwest. There’s definitely a way one can describe it which is ExxonMobil is blocking.
I would say to you, blocking looks like this. That’s not our posture on Bonga. Our posture on Bonga Southwest has been to help and support the operator and the partners to do the necessary work to improve its readiness for FID. Part of what’s being needed is an enabling fiscal structure that now exists.
But also part of what’s being needed is the maturity of the resource understanding and the maturity of the project-specific application of national content and contracting strategy. So the perception is blocking, but I would offer to you that we have tried to express first of all what can make Bonga Southwest compete in our capital portfolio. That’s a partner view. But in doing that, it also makes the project more capitally competitive. So that when we do invest, we are not simply getting barrels recovering extra CAPEX, which otherwise would be shared across the shareholders. That important factor is often lost in the top line narrative that somehow our partners want.
It’s an expression of what can make that investment capitally competitive and when it is capitally competitive, it’s also unlocking the best total value for shareholders. Otherwise, the CAPEX will be high, the schedule will be long, the investors will recover capital; we will recover our capital under a PSC contract. It’s just not fair to the nation that that’s what happens.
So underlying this is an expression of hey, we should do the work and we should ask our stakeholders to do the work with us to make as big an investment as Bonga Southwest competitive at a global scale. In Nigeria, it may not be the most competitive, but that’s okay. But it needs to be competitive because otherwise the barrels will produce, the dollars will come and it will recover to the investors. It’s just not fair.
So this is what’s underlying the stance of saying, “Hey, it’s not ready.” We’re not blocking it just because I took my toys and went home. We’re expressing a view that more needs to be done to make it ready. This administration, His Excellency the president and the honourable ministers and other stakeholders today allow for honest discussion like that to be tabled and we can move forward together. That’s the way I would describe it today. It is not just blocking for blocking sake but it is an expression of improving the project and in doing that for the investors, we will do that for everyone.
UK major Shell will commence gas production at the Mina West field in Egypt’s segment of the Mediterranean Sea, in the fourth quarter of 2026.
The project, expected to top up the country’ output by 160Million standard cubic feet of gas per day, is being developed by Shell and Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company (KUFPEC), in partnership with Egypt’s Rashid Petroleum.
Dalia El Gabry, Shell Egypt’s Country Chair, met with Karim Baldawi, Egyptian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, last week (May 4, 2026), to brief him on the project.
Shell discovered the Mina West accumulation in November 2023 with Mina West-1 well, located in North East El-Amriya block. The well was drilled by the drillship Stena Forth.
Mina West-2, the second well in the field, is currently being drilled by Stena IceMax, another Stena Drilling drillship.
Mina West- 1 and Mina West-2 will be tied back to existing production facilities in the West Delta Deep Marine (WDDM) area.
After drilling Mina West-2, Stena IceMax will move to the exploratory Sirius-1 well in the same block, to assess a gas reservoir in shallower waters, followed by the Velox well in the North Cleopatra area in the Herodotus Basin, aimed at opening new prospects for gas discoveries.
Egypt is desperate to increase gas production to supply its 40+,000MW thermal plants and feed its gas addicted industries. Output has fallen from higher than 7Billion standard cubic feet per day (7Bscf/d) in 2021 to less than 5Bscf/d in 2026. The country has been importing dozens of LNG cargos.
Nigeria’s state hydrocarbon firm NNPC Limited has reported successful completion of the River Niger Crossing of the 130-kilometre Obiafu-Obrikom-Oben (OB3) Gas Pipeline.
“It’s the crucial “milestone in the expansion of Nigeria’s national gas transmission network”, the company declares in a statement.
The project is being constructed by NNPC Gas Infrastructure Company (NGIC), a wholly owned subsidiary of NNPC Limited. Construction has so far lasted over 13 years, with the River Niger Crossing taking over six years and becoming the chain that determines the rate of construction.
“The successful crossing unlocks the full potential of the OB3 Pipeline, a strategic infrastructure designed to transport up to 2Billion standard cubic feet of gas per day”, the statement notes. “Executed approximately two kilometres beneath the River Niger riverbed, the technically complex crossing was delivered by the NNPC project team working with PCE Nig. Limited, using advanced horizontal directional drilling (HDD) technology”.
With the crossing, the construction has between five and 10 kilometres pipe-work to reach mechanical completion, after which is the commissioning phase. The River Niger Crossing is an important chokehold, but its resolution does not finalise the OB3 construction.
“The OB3 Pipeline will serve as a backbone gas infrastructure linking the Eastern gas network to the Western network and extending connectivity to the Northern corridor through the AKK Pipeline. In the near term, the successful crossing is expected to unlock over 500Million standard cubic feet of incremental gas supply for the domestic market, supporting power generation, industrial growth, and gas supply to the West African market”, NNPC says.
If you are confused about the future outcome of the scope and direction of Europe’s natural gas policies then Ihope this article will bring you some clarity and understanding. Not only about Europe’s energy politics but also the implications for Asia and Africa.
Firstly, the EU has, since the invasion by Russia of the Ukraine, virtually stopped all Russian gas imports; importantly too is that Norway and the USA have very quickly moved to fill this vacuum.
Secondly, future LNG prices are becoming an incentive—certainly in the case of South Korea, Japan and other Asian markets—to turn to renewables as an alternative economical energy source.
Finally, developing African LNG projects must come to terms what this will mean for their projects.
The Present Situation
In January 2026, the European Council adopted a regulation to prohibit both LNG and pipeline gas imports from Russia starting from 18 March 2026, with transition periods for existing contracts. By the end of 2027, all Russian gas imports will be prohibited.
Russia’s share of EU imports of pipeline gas dropped from around 40% in 2021 to around 6% in 2025. For pipeline gas and LNG combined, Russia accounted for around 12% of total EU gas imports in 2025.
Gas imports from Russia declined from over 5.3Trillion cubic feet(Tcf) in 2021 to 1.3Tcf in 2025. This was mainly compensated for by increasing imports from the USA and Norway: the USA increased from 667Billion cubic feet in 2021 to 2.6Tcf in 2025; and imports from Norway grew from 2.8Tcf in 2021 to 3.15Tcf in 2025.
The EU’s demand for natural gas declined by over 19% between 2021 and 2024.
Natural Gas Price Outlook
Morgan Stanley has significantly raised its European natural gas (TTF) price forecasts due to expected LNG supply constraints, with Q2 2026 prices expected to average $23 per Million British Thermal Units (MMBtu): A potential 8Million-ton supply reduction from Qatar could create a market deficit, with extreme scenarios potentially pushing up prices. For example:
Q2 2026: Raised to $23/MMBtu from a previous $16/MMBtu forecast.
Q3 2026: Raised to $19/MMBtu from $10/MMBtu.
Q4 2026: Raised to $12/MMBtu from $9/MMBtu.
As of early April 2026, European gas storage levels have decreased following a relatively cold winter, with the EU average dropping towards 29-30% full, though this remains above 2021 averages.
Storage Trends: The winter withdrawal season has ended, with inventories projected to end winter at around 22% in some areas, which is lower than historical norms.
Refilling Challenges: Low levels are fueling concerns about the upcoming summer restocking season, which will require significant LNG imports.
Outlook: Despite the low levels, European storage remains functional, with plans to rebuild stocks ahead of winter.
No doubt storage operators are awaiting more market clarity: whether or not storage prices will fall, or continue to rise.
LNG/Renewables—the case of Asia
South Korea
According to a recent Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis(IEEFA) report ”South Korea has announced an accelerated roadmap targeting 100 gigawatts (GW) of renewables by 2030, supported by village-scale solar, heat conversion, renewables-supplied industrial complexes, and policy reforms to reduce costs and develop a domestic green technology industry.”
“The marginal cost of generating electricity from liquefied natural gas (LNG) has doubled in South Korea. Fuel costs alone — excluding fixed generation, transmission, distribution, and other charges — now roughly match the full retail electricity tariffs charged by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) to customers.”
“Although solar and wind energy costs in South Korea are currently 80%–250% higher than global averages, the IEEFA estimates that the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for solar and onshore wind can already compete with — and in many cases undercut — the marginal fuel costs of LNG-fired power generation.”
Japan
Japan’s anti-LNG stance is proving to be important.
Not it’s need for importing LNG but because of its buying and re-selling its imported LNG to other Asian countries. In essence this infra-trading is creating a new sub-market.
The over-supply of Japanese LNG will in the coming days be a buffer for the effective loss of some 20% of global LNG: lost because of closure of the Strait of Hormuz and QatarEnergy’s declaration of force majeure of LNG shipments from Ras Laffan.
Sam Reynolds, IEEFA’s Research Lead LNG/Gas Asia, declares that ”40% of all LNG volumes handled by Japanese companies are sold elsewhere, up from just 16% in FY2018.
Japan’s resales of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to foreign markets continued to reach new highs in 2024, up nearly 15% compared to the previous year.”
“The country’s domestic consumption of LNG marginally increased but has fallen by nearly 20% since 2018, according to the latest LNG handling survey of 30 companies conducted by the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC).”
“In 2024, Japanese LNG resales were approximately 1.7 times Japan’s total direct imports from Australia, its largest LNG supplier. Resales amounted to around four times the volumes purchased from Malaysia, Japan’s second-largest LNG supplier.
Japan resold more LNG to other countries in 2024 than the total volume of LNG produced in Russia, the world’s fourth-largest LNG exporter.”
IEEFA anticipates that …”nuclear restarts and the uptake of renewables in Japan are expected to further reduce LNG demand in the coming years. … Japanese energy companies are likely to play an even more active role as LNG traders. The country’s 7th Strategic Energy Plan foresees demand falling to as low as 53 million tonnes by 2040 — a 20% reduction from current levels.”
The African Connection
Major LNG projects in Africa are undergoing rapid development in 2026, driven by over $50Billion in investments, primarily in Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania, aiming to turn the continent into a global energy supplier.
Given the need for continued diversity and security of supply will African LNG projects become part of Europe’s energy mix?
Key and Emerging LNG Projects:
Mozambique:
Mozambique LNG (Area1): Operated by TOTALEnergies this $20 billion project is restarting in 2026 after a force majeure suspension, with 13Million Tonnes Per Annum (MMTPA) capacity planned.
Rovuma LNG: Led by ExxonMobil, a $30Billion project with a Final Investment Decision (FID) expected in 2026, aiming for 18MMTPA.
Coral Sul FLNG: Currently producing 3.4MMTPA, with the $7.2Billion Coral Norte FLNG project approved to double capacity by 2028.
Tanzania:
Likong’o-Mchinga LNG: A $42Billion project involving Shell and Equinor is moving toward a 2026 FID, targeting 10MMTPA capacity.
West Africa (Nigeria, Senegal, Congo):
Nigeria LNG(NLNG): Continues operation, with new, smaller projects like the 2.8MMTPA FLNG project anticipated by 2028.
Developing offshore gas to commercialize resources without large onshore plants and involving BP and Kosmos Energy.
Congo LNG: ENI is developing the first natural gas liquefaction project in the Republic of Congo.
Some Final Conclusions
Will natural gas prices continue on an upward trend? Europe-given that gas storages are currently not yet being replenished—are taking a wait-and-see-attitude.
South Korea and Japan—both highly dependent on imported LNG—are taking steps to continuing reducing LNG imports and building on renewables which are seen to be very competitive with fossil fuels.
African LNG projects should be warned: get your project approved and ensure you have a final investment decision …otherwise it could become a future stranded asset!
Gerard Kreeft, BA (Calvin University, Grand Rapids, USA) and MA (Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada), Energy Transition Adviser, was founder and owner of EnergyWise. He has managed and implemented energy conferences, seminars and university master classes in Alaska, Angola, Brazil, Canada, India, Libya, Kazakhstan, Russia and throughout Europe. Gerard has Dutch and Canadian citizenship and resides in the Netherlands.He writes on a regular basis for Africa Oil + Gas Report, and contributes to IEEFA(Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis). His book the 10 commandments of the Energy Transition is now on sale at Bookstorehttps://books.friesenpress.com/store/title/119734000211674846/Gerard-Kreeft-The-10-Commandments-of-the-Energy-Transition
The Azule Energy led New Gas Consortium (NGC) has commenced production of the Quiluma field situated in Block 2, in shallow waters off the coast of Angola.
It is the first development of a non-associated gas (NAG) field in the country. Initial gas export from Quiluma is set at 150Million standard cubic feet per day MMscf/d, with output expected to ramp up to 330MMscf/d within 2026. Gas will be treated at the NGC gas treatment plant in Soyo, inaugurated in November 2025, and then supplied to the Angola LNG (ALNG) plant for export and domestic consumption.
Azule Energy, a 50-50 incorporated joint venture of BP and ENI, operates the asset with 37.4%, , Partners include Chevron (31%), through its local subsidiary Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, Sonangol E&P (19.8%) and TOTALEnergis (11.8%) interest.
A press release by ENI says that the project’s expected peak output of 330MMscf/d of gas “is equivalent to approximately 2Million tonnes of LNG per year”. That’ 40% of the capacity of the ALNG plant.
“By ensuring a sustainable long term gas supply for the Angola LNG plant, the project strengthens Angola’s ability to supply LNG to international markets in the long run, including Europe and Asia,” ENI said, adding: “NGC focuses on the development of the first non-associated gas fields in the Republic of Angola and is set to both maximise the country’s LNG export and the utilization of domestic gas for local development”.
Just at a time when there was a global over-supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), the current Middle-East crisisunfolded and with it some surprising outcomes.
Most interesting and providential has been Japan: not its need for importing LNG but because of its buying and re-selling its imported LNG to other Asian countries. In essence this infra-trading is creating a new sub-market.
With much of the Middle-East in turmoil this emerging Japanese sub-market is potentially being expanded to include upstream investments in LNG projects in Africa, Canada and the USA thus ensuring future security and diversity of supply.
The over-supply of Japanese LNG will in the coming days will be a buffer for the effective loss of some 20% of global LNG: lost because of closure of the Strait of Hormuz and QatarEnergy’s declaration of force majeure of LNG shipments from Ras Laffan.
How this new sub-market was created
Sam Reynolds, Research Lead LNG/Gas Asia at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) recently posted an insightful analysis how Japan is coping with its over-abundance of LNG.
”40% of all LNG volumes handled by Japanese companies are sold elsewhere, up from just 16% in FY2018”, according to Reynolds.
“Japan’s resales of LNG to foreign markets continued to reach new highs in 2024, up nearly 15% compared to the previous year.”
“The country’s domestic consumption of LNG marginally increased but has fallen by nearly 20% since 2018, according to the latest LNG handling survey of 30 companies conducted by the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC).”
Yet ”Japanese energy companies and trading houses are increasingly targeting overseas markets, aiming to capitalize on arbitrage opportunities and develop long-term relationships with customers abroad,” the IEEFA analyst explains.
..”Japanese companies and policymakers have persistently lobbied foreign governments to facilitate the development of upstream gas production and LNG export projects, citing energy security concerns”.
“In 2024, Japanese LNG resales were approximately 1.7 times Japan’s total direct imports from Australia, its largest LNG supplier. Resales amounted to around four times the volumes purchased from Malaysia, Japan’s second-largest LNG supplier.
Japan resold more LNG to other countries in 2024 than the total volume of LNG produced in Russia, the world’s fourth-largest LNG exporter.”
IEEFA anticipates that …”nuclear restarts and the uptake of renewables in Japan are expected to further reduce LNG demand in the coming years. … Japanese energy companies are likely to play an even more active role as LNG traders. The country’s 7th Strategic Energy Plan foresees demand falling to as low as 53Million tonnes by 2040 — a 20% reduction from current levels.”
Shell’s Outlook
In its 2025 LNG Outlook Shell presents a bullish LNG future: “The global trade in LNG is set to rise significantly by 2040, driven by Asian economic growth, the need to decarbonize heavy industry and transport and the emerging growth in the energy-intense tech sector.”
Shell’s bullish outlook is both in IEEFA’s and my analysis much too optimistic!
Shell’s 2025 LNG Outlook was published prior to the current Middle-East energy crisis. Yet the report is deadly silent about the LNG intra-trading taking place within Asia. Instead, we are presented a story of growth–albeit a slower growth in Asia:
“Global trade in LNG reached 407Million tonnes in 2024, an increase of just 3Million tonnes from 2023, the lowest annual supply addition for 10 years”.
Japan’s Rainmaker Role
Between 2013-2023 Japanese public institutions–Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC), Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Development Bank of Japan (DBJ)– provided a $93Billion in support for overseas oil and gas projects between 2013 and 2023 fiscal years (April 2013 to March 2024), of which 45% of finance concentrated on upstream investments.
A key note: Mozambique was the top recipient country–$8.2Billion—for the financing of the Rovuma Area 1 LNG project.
Source: Solutions for Our Climate (SFOC), Oil Change International (OCI), and Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)
Reynolds says that most of the new deals are with US producers because of the inherent flexibility of US contracts, allowing buyers to determine the final destination. In the past deals with Qatar were rather rigid but are now are starting to contain terms for destination flexibility and diversion rights.
Japan’s infra-trading will no doubt be expanded to include Africa, Canada and the USA.
The African Connection
Major LNG projects in Africa are undergoing rapid development in 2026, driven by over $50Billion in investments, primarily in Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania, aiming to turn the continent into a global energy supplier.
Given the need for continued diversity and security of supply, Asian and most likely Japanese buyers will undoubtedly lock in more LNG supplies in spite of the rising cost.
Key and Emerging LNG Projects:
Mozambique:
Mozambique LNG (Area1): Operated by TOTALEnergies this $20Billion project is restarting in 2026 after a force majeure suspension, with 13Million Tonnes Per Annum (MMTPA) capacity planned.
Rovuma LNG: Led by ExxonMobil, a $30Billion project with a Final Investment Decision (FID) expected in 2026, aiming for 18 MMTPA.
Coral Sul FLNG: Currently producing 3.4 mtpa, with the $7.2Billion Coral Norte FLNG project approved to double capacity by 2028.
Tanzania:
Likong’o-Mchinga LNG: A $42Billion project involving Shell and Equinor is moving toward a 2026 FID, targeting 10MMTPA capacity.
West Africa (Nigeria, Senegal, Congo):
Nigeria LNG(NLNG): Continues operation, with new, smaller projects like the 2.8 MMTPA FLNG project anticipated by 2028.
Developing offshore gas to commercialize resources without large onshore plants and involving BP and Kosmos Energy.
Congo LNG: ENI is developing the first natural gas liquefaction project in the Republic of Congo.
Key Canadian LNG Projects
LNG Canada (Kitimat): The largest private-sector project in Canadian history, this joint venture (Shell, Petronas, PetroChina, Mitsubishi, KOGAS) has been exporting LNG since 2025. Phase 1 features two trains with an export capacity of 14MMTPA.
Cedar LNG (Kitimat): A partnership with the Haisla Nation, this floating facility confirmed its Final Investment Decision (FID) in June 2024, with operations expected by late 2028.
Ksi Lisims LNG (Pearse Island): A proposed 12 MMTPA floating project, this is a collaboration between the Nisg̱a’a Nation, Western LNG, and Rockies LNG, currently in the regulatory process.
Woodfibre LNG (Squamish): Under construction, this project is located near Vancouver.
Tilbury LNG (Delta): Operated by FortisBC, this facility is planning Phase 2 expansion to increase capacity.
Key USA Active and Developing LNG Projects
Corpus Christi LNG (TX): Operating with expansion projects (Trains 8 & 9) reaching positive Final Investment Decision (FID) in June 2025.
Rio Grande LNG (TX): Phase 2 development.
Port Arthur LNG (TX): Phase 2 contracted 1.4 Bcf/d in 2025.
Cameron LNG (LA): Major operating facility with further development.
Plaquemines LNG (LA): Shipped first cargo in 2025.
Golden Pass LNG (TX): First train expected to start in early 2026.
Commonwealth LNG (LA): 9.5MMTPA terminal project.
CP2 LNG (LA): Phase 1 expected in 2027.
Alaska LNG: Project currently in development.
Some Final Comments
Wittingly or unwittingly Japan’s infra-trading is creating a new LNG sub-market: LNG marketeers always anxious to ensure they can ship their energy molecules are religiously avoiding any shipping in the Gulf region. Who can blame them! And who will benefit? Certainly, LNG projects in Africa, Canada and the USA will deliver their final LNG cargoes somewhere in Asia, staying far away from the Gulf region.
What Japan has historically been doing—investing in overseas projects—will be vastly increased to ensure its security and diversity of supply. Other countries will follow.
And the USA?
It has become the world’s largest exporter of LNG, having secured the top spot in 2022 and maintaining it through 2026 with record- setting exports surpassing 10Million metric tonnes in a single month for the first time in October 2025, primarily supplying Europe and Asia. Expect a continued upturn from Asian and African countries in USA LNG projects to ensure their diversity and security of supplies.
Gerard Kreeft, BA (Calvin University, Grand Rapids, USA) and MA (Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada), Energy Transition Adviser, was founder and owner of EnergyWise. He has managed and implemented energy conferences, seminars and university master classes in Alaska, Angola, Brazil, Canada, India, Libya, Kazakhstan, Russia and throughout Europe. Gerard has Dutch and Canadian citizenship and resides in the Netherlands.He writes on a regular basis for Africa Oil + Gas Report, and contributes to IEEFA(Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis). His book the 10 commandments of the Energy Transition is now on sale at Bookstorehttps://books.friesenpress.com/store/title/119734000211674846/Gerard-Kreeft-The-10-Commandments-of-the-Energy-Transition
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