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The Nigerian junior Matrix Energy and the French major TOTALEnergies have each recently concluded  a three dimensional (3D) seismic data acquisition  in shallow water assets offshore Nigeria.

The two projects were carried out for the two companies by Shearwater Geoservices AS.

Shearwater’s press release did not disclose the size of data acquired for Matrix in Oil Prospecting License (OPL) 2010  and TOTAL in Oil Mining License (OML) 100.

The data was executed in partnership with Harvex Geosolutions.

“The two-month survey acquired high-quality 3D data using a towed-streamer configuration with an undershoot. The SW Duchess served as the primary seismic vessel, with the SW Gallien acting as the dedicated source vessel.

“Shearwater is pleased to complete this 3D towed‑streamer and undershoot survey offshore Nigeria, which continues our strong relationship with TOTALEnergies and builds on a programme of work in Nigeria and across the region”, said Shearwater CEO Irene Waage Basili.

By Toyin Akinosho, in Eket

Media criticism of Bayo Ojulari’s team has focused extensively on the overall crude oil output of the country.

This is a misapplication of blame.

His 14 month old management at NNPC Ltd, the Nigerian state hydrocarbon company, missed one crucial target: the completion of the Obiafu-Obrikom-Oben (OB3) Gas Pipeline.

NNPC also failed, in those 420 days, to deliver on the final commissioning of the Ajaokuta-Kaduna-Kano (AKK) pipeline in that time frame.

The recent announcement of the completion of the  OB3 River Niger Crossing project only means that mechanical completion is near at hand: the last leg is the commissioning phase.

The OB3 has been under construction for more than 13 years and the AKK, the construction of which was launched with fanfare six years ago, was meant to be on stream by 2023, then, 2024, then 2025.

Mr. Ojulari has publicly lamented that his predecessors had wasted billions of dollars on EPC contracts on refurbishment of the four state owned refineries with 445,000Barrels per Stream Day capacity, none of which his own management has been able to revive.

His own solution: to bring in technically honed and well-heeled partners from China to operate the plants with NNPC taking equity and a back seat in operations, is still a work in progress.

NNPC’s share of Nigeria’s producing and producible assets is large, but the company’s operational reach is not adequate enough to spring Nigeria free from the lower for longer output constraint, which has kept crude and condensate production between the 1.68Million Barrels Per Day (BPD), in April 2025, when Ojulari took the reins of the company, and 1.66MMBPD in April 2026. In most of the intervening months, the volumes have been lower than these two.

NNPC Ltd is no longer the Nigerian petroleum industry’s overarching player that it was before September 2021. The country’s crude production target, set out in the national budget every year, is as much the responsibility of regulatory agencies, the security apparatus, state governments, host communities and other operating companies, as it is of the NNPC Ltd.

NNPC does not have much leverage on the output from Nigeria’s seven producing deep-water fields, collectively delivering around 350,000BOPD. They are products of Production Sharing Agreements, which call for upfront investment by the “contractors” who then recoup their money from barrels produced over time.

NNPC has little leeway over lax production performances of operating companies, even when they are its JV partners. What can the state hydrocarbon firm do about the regulatory agency NUPRC’s leniency on Nembe E&P Ltd, which has been a suboptimal operator of the highly hydrocarbon charged Oil Mining Lease (OML) 29, producing less than 46,000BOPD at peak over the last five years, when it can conveniently achieve 150,000BIPD?

Is it NNPC’s remit to act on claims by those who argue that the billionaire Mike Adenuga, owner of Conoil and Continental Oil “has the right to treat his business the way he deems fit”, including the choice  to keep five highly prospective OMLs producing less than 18,000BOPD in the last five years?.

Aliko Damgote ‘s West African Exploration and Production (WAEP) acquired OMLs 71&72 in 2015. Amni International acquired OML 52 in the same year. Eleven years after, none of these three assets has produced a single drop of oil.  That’s far less about poor NNPC Management and more of lax NUPRC oversight.

First E&P had held OMLs 83&5 in the same number of years that WAEP and Amni had operated OMLs 71, 72 &52 without a drop of oil or a flame of gas,  and has been producing scores of thousands of barrels every day from those assets in the last five years. In at least two of these last five years, First E&P has delivered 45,000barrels every single day at a steady state. As I write, that company is on course of completing a processing plant to deliver 100Million standard  cubic feet of gas per day (100MMscf/d) for supply to the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited.

In the last five years, Aradel Plc has doubled crude and gas output to 13,000BOPD and 77MMscf/d out of-not an OML but- a marginal field!  Seplat acquired OML 53 in the same year and from the same company that Amini purchased OM 52. Today, Seplat is producing around 10,000BOPD from OML 53 and has commissioned through an SPV it co-owns with the Nigerian Gas Company (NGC), a gas processing plant currently delivering 120MMsf/d to two customers: one for the local economy, the other for export.

A huge part of the reason Nigeria is stuck with low crude oil production is operators’ performances. The drill or drop clause in the Petroleum Industry Act is not NNPC’s to invoke.

All of this is not to argue that NNPC is entirely blameless for Nigeria’s low production. The company’s own 100% held OMLs (including OMLs 64,65, 66, 86, 88 & 119) have not moved the needle in crude oil output in the last one year. Ojulari frustrates would-be- admirers like me when he celebrates the alleged record increase in NEPL output to 355,000BOPD. NEPL is the E&P operating subsidiary of NNPC. We all know that the extra 20,00BOPD-if we could agree on that number- that led to this so called increase didn’t come from any sweating of data by NEPL.

Ojulari, a former CEO of SNEPCo, the Shell Nigeria deepwater subsidiary, was ushered in with a star studded board of directors chaired by Ahmad Kida-Musa, he also of impeccable credentials, whose last 9-5 job was being Deputy Managing Director Deepwater Services, of TOTAL Upstream Nigeria.

The board was empanelled to strengthen investor confidence and address operational inefficiencies. One of its most pronounced Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), outlined in the Nigerian president’s statement, was “boosting oil production to 2Million barrels daily by 2027 and 3Million (3MMBPD); gas production to be increased to 8Billion cubic feet daily (Bscf/d) by 2027 and 10Bscf/d by 2030, with NNPC’s share of crude oil refining output uplifted to 200,000Barrels per stream day  by 2027 and to 500,000 by 2030”.

That emphasis by President Tinubu on its own is a pressure point that has encouraged the Nigerian media to see NNPC as the sole deliverer of all of Nigeria’s output. Mr. Ojulari himself has prioritized crude oil output growth on his social media postings.

Ojulari launched a strategic portfolio review of NNPC-operated and Joint Venture Assets swiftly in his first month on the job, aligning with the Head of State’s value maximisation objectives.

The company concluded the strategic portfolio reviews of its assets in less than five months of the board’s taking over, thus delivering on the assigned “immediate action plan”. But the company has been stuck on delivering on the hard production numbers for its own 100% operated assets.

I spoke to three members of the 11 man board of directors and two members of the executive management and the sense I got is that the work of the  last 420 days “has largely been to undo the built- in- decadence of the company”. The board no longer sits on contracts awards; that’s not its job, I was told. NNPC has succeeded in being P&L (Profit and Loss) accountable. NNPCL now pays out- all that is due to the Federal and State Governments (the Federation) before anything else (and that has been before the Executive Order). “We have streamed light on the opacity surrounding the Finance and Technical Service Agreements (FTSAs) entered with several companies in some of the most prospective assets in the Niger Delta”, three board members emphatically told me, speaking on conditions of anonymity as they are not cleared to speak.

NNPC has forced the relationship between (the Indian operator) SEEPCO and NNPC to be more open and transparent “so we can track the paper trail, metaphorically speaking”, my sources enthused. To bolster the refining capacity, NNPC has been scouring the globe, looking for partners to fund the overhaul of the refineries and operate the plants with NNPC having equity. The company is also working to increase its share in the Dangote Refinery”.

But the Nigerian public, it’s true, hasn’t seen this “progress”. And Ojulari’s social postings on his own achievement smack of an underwhelming sense of mission. His social media handlers should take note.

The piece was originally published in the March 2026 edition of Africa Oil+Gas Report, a monthly publication in pdf format, distrusted to paying subscribers. It is being republished here, for its public service value.

is themed: 

NIGERIA: THE REFORM UPDATE 

Below is the link to your copy:

https://africa-oil-gas-report.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AOGR-Vol.-27-No.3-2026-.pdf

Some of the highlights:

KICKSTARTER

• NNPC Missed Targets, But is Blamed For the Wrong Things

COVER FEATURE

• Operators’ Perception of New Regulators
• Mixed Messages Led to Petroleum Taskforce 

WHO IS BUYING/SELLING?

• First E&P in Talks to Buy Out NNPC
• NNPC Divestment Slows
• Orca Leaves Tanzania
• BWE Gets 25 More Years 

DOWNSTREAM/RETAIL

• Dangote is Offered More than it Admits
• Waltersmith to Produce Jet Fuel

IN THE NEWS

• African Ports Thrive on the Fracas at Hormuz
• Angolan Operator in $50+Billion Claim

NEW MAPS

• Renaissance/SEPNU Activity Maps
• Nigerian Bid Round Map-Update

SPREADSHEETS

• Angolan Full Rig Activity Details March 2026

By Dan D. Kunle

OPINION/ANALYSIS

Hope is part of Nigeria’s national character. We endure setbacks yet continue to believe renewal is possible. But optimism must never become a substitute for reality. It must be tested against evidence, performance and outcomes.

It is from that standpoint that I reflect on the future of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPC Ltd) and what it means for Nigeria.

Few institutions matter more to the Nigerian state. Recent developments underscore just how strategic energy institutions can be when they are properly conceived and executed. The emergence of the Dangote Refinery, despite its well‑known challenges and controversies, has already altered Nigeria’s energy calculus. At a time of heightened global supply disruptions, volatile geopolitics and constrained refining capacity across multiple regions, the commissioning of a large, integrated domestic refinery has begun to reduce Nigeria’s exposure to external shocks, ease pressure on foreign exchange and improve fuel availability. Its impact, even at partial operations, illustrates what competent capital mobilisation, clarity of purpose and scale, can achieve for national energy security. It also serves as a reminder that institutional performance, not intent, is what ultimately reshapes outcomes.

NNPC Ltd sits at the centre of public finance, foreign exchange earnings, energy security and investor confidence. For decades, petroleum revenues have sustained federal and state budgets, financed imports and provided the fiscal oxygen on which government depends. Agriculture no longer carries the economy as it once did. Manufacturing remains weak. Non‑oil exports are still too small. In practical terms, Nigeria remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbons. That is why the future of NNPC Ltd is inseparable from the future of Nigeria.

“It is also too early to pronounce failure. What is clear is that the harder phase of reform still lies ahead. My greater concern is whether the approaching political cycle will deny management the policy focus, institutional backing and difficult decisions required to succeed. Reform in Nigeria often slows when politics intensifies. That must not happen again.”

When the current leadership team, led by Group Chief Executive Officer Bayo Ojulari and the board chaired by Musa Ahmadu‑Kida, assumed office, many expected a decisive break from the past. The hope was that a commercially run company, backed by the Petroleum Industry Act, would finally emerge from the ruins of bureaucracy, opacity and political patronage. I shared that hope.

After observing developments over the past year, however, I have become less optimistic and more cautious. The issue is not personalities. It is structural.

Nigeria has attempted to create a modern national energy company while preserving an old political control model. That contradiction lies at the heart of NNPC Ltd’s difficulties. In theory, NNPC Ltd belongs to Nigerians. In practice, Nigerians can only exercise ownership indirectly through the state. Effective governing authority rests largely with the presidency, which appoints ministers, directors and senior executives. The result is layered ownership, centralised power and diffused accountability. Such a model rarely produces transformational institutions.

Boards struggle to exercise independent authority when ultimate political power lies elsewhere. Management teams find themselves constrained by political calculations, competing interests and administrative caution. Commercial logic often yields to state expediency. Decisions that should take weeks can take months. Problems that should be solved commercially become prolonged disputes. No serious company can thrive under those conditions.

This helps explain why many of the operational weaknesses associated with the old NNPC remain visible in the new NNPC Ltd. Joint ventures remain less effective than they should be. Technical and financial service agreements are not always managed with sufficient urgency. Asset optimisation remains slow.

Internal coordination appears weak. Cost discipline is uneven. A culture of delay still competes with the need for delivery.

The greatest tragedy is that Nigeria is not suffering from a lack of resources. It is suffering from underperformance. Several producing assets continue to illustrate this failure. OML 18, OML 24, OML 29, OML 42, OML 123 and OML124 are examples often cited in industry discussions as assets whose potentials have not been fully realised. Some remain constrained by evacuation challenges, unresolved commercial disputes, infrastructure limitations or management bottlenecks. These are not geological failures. They are governance failures.

An oil‑producing nation with Nigeria’s reserves should not be struggling to maximise already discovered and producing assets. Such matters ought to be resolved through competent negotiation, decisive leadership and disciplined execution. Instead, opportunities are delayed while national needs grow. The economic cost is immense.

Every barrel not produced is lost revenue. Every gas molecule not commercialised is lost industrial power. Every delayed investment decision weakens confidence. Every unresolved dispute signals risk to international capital. Investors do not wait indefinitely. Capital flows to jurisdictions where rules are clear, governance is predictable and execution is credible. Nigeria today competes for investment not only with Angola and Guyana, but with the United States shale sector, the Middle East and emerging producers across Africa. Sentiment alone will not attract capital. Performance will.

Without deep reform, external investment will remain cautious. Joint ventures will continue to perform below potential. Oil and gas production will remain under‑optimised. Leakages will persist. Revenue pressures will intensify. And when the country’s most strategic commercial institution underperforms, the wider economy eventually pays the price. This is why the debate around NNPC Ltd must move beyond personalities. No chief executive, however competent, can fully succeed inside a structure designed to dilute authority and multiply interference. Likewise, no board can deliver exceptional governance if it lacks the power, autonomy or political backing to enforce standards. Systems matter more than individuals.

It is against this backdrop that the appointment of Mr Fola Adeola to lead a presidential energy task force must be understood. The very creation of such a body is itself an admission of the depth and persistence of failure across Nigeria’s energy sector. A task force is rarely convened where systems are working; it is convened when normal structures have proven inadequate.

Yet the composition of the task force raises difficult questions about continuity of reform thinking. Many of the individuals who played defining roles in Nigeria’s foundational oil and gas reforms of the early 2000s, figures such as Mallam Nasir El‑Rufai, Dr M. M. Ibrahim and Professor Yinka Omorogbe, SAN, are noticeably absent. Institutions do not reform themselves through goodwill alone; they require memory, precedent and hard‑won experience. How this task force will navigate the full breadth of Nigeria’s energy value chain, reconcile competing interests and translate diagnosis into execution remains unclear.

For now, it is an experiment that warrants close observation rather than premature judgment. Another concern is continuity of reform thinking. Many of those associated with earlier oil and gas reform efforts are no longer present in the current architecture. That is not to suggest reform belongs to any one generation, but institutions need memory. They need continuity of

purpose, accumulated learning and consistency of execution. When reform becomes episodic, progress becomes fragile.

Nigeria should by now be targeting materially higher crude production over time, while aggressively expanding gas supply for domestic power, petrochemicals, fertiliser and exports. With one of the world’s largest gas endowments, the country should be building an industrial economy around energy abundance. Yet ambition without institutional capacity is merely rhetoric. What then is required?

First, governance must be clarified. Ownership and accountability cannot remain blurred. Second, the board must have genuine authority to govern, not symbolic responsibility without power. Third, management must be empowered to act commercially within clear performance targets, insulated as far as possible from routine political intrusion. Fourth, stranded and underperforming assets must be urgently reviewed, restructured and commercialised. Fifth, transparency, procurement discipline, digital accountability and cost efficiency must become non‑negotiable.

Above all, national interest must prevail over internal turf battles. To conclude, I am not an incurable pessimist. Nor am I hostile to the current leadership. I remain hopeful that course correction is still possible. But hope must be earned through measurable outcomes. From all available records and information within the sector, one year is too short a period to fairly and objectively assess the full performance of Bayo Ojulari and his team. The scale of dysfunction inherited, particularly across the upstream and downstream value chain, means no serious transformation could have been completed within such a short time.

To his credit, there are signs of pragmatism. The willingness to move away from endlessly funding troubled refineries and to confront the burden of stranded downstream assets suggests a more realistic reading of Nigeria’s energy challenges. Yet realism alone is not enough. The progress visible so far is insufficient to justify stellar pass marks. But it is also too early to pronounce failure. What is clear is that the harder phase of reform still lies ahead. My greater concern is whether the approaching political cycle will deny management the policy focus, institutional backing and difficult decisions required to succeed. Reform in Nigeria often slows when politics intensifies.

That must not happen again.

NNPC Ltd remains too important to be trapped between old inefficiencies and new distractions. Its success will strengthen public finance, investor confidence, energy security and national stability. Its failure will deepen pressures already facing the country. For now, judgment should remain reserved, expectations should remain high, and performance should remain the only true measure. The future of NNPC Ltd, and in many respects the future of Nigeria, will be decided not by promises, but by what happens next.

Dan D Kunle, Nigeria’s most subscribed energy analyst, writes from Abuja

By Doyin Ogun

OPINION/ANALYSIS

Every barrel Nigeria produces carries an unpaid story before it reaches a terminal. A rig has moved. A crew has slept offshore. Chemicals have been supplied. A vessel has sailed. A compressor has been maintained. A valve has been replaced. A Nigerian firm has borrowed from a bank, paid salaries, bought spares, handled logistics, met safety requirements, and waited for a certified invoice to turn into cash.

When that cash does not come, production begins to decay before anyone sees the damage.

Nigeria often debates crude oil theft, pipelines, security, divestments, licensing rounds and output targets. Those debates matter. Still, one of the most corrosive threats in the petroleum industry sits inside ordinary accounts payable ledgers. Payment delinquency to contractors is quiet, technical and sometimes hidden behind dispute language. Its damage is brutal. It kills businesses, throws skilled workers into uncertainty, weakens banks, raises operating costs and makes national production targets less credible.

Contractors are not vendors at the edge of the industry. They are the hands, machines and brains that get oil and gas out of the ground.

The national numbers show why this matters

Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC)’s 2026 production data show daily liquid averages of 1.627Million barrels per day in January, 1.484Million barrels per day in February and 1.546Million barrels per day in March, with March comprising 1.383Million barrels per day of crude oil and 163,251 barrels per day of condensate. The same NUPRC table records lowest and peak combined crude and condensate production of 1.40Million and 1.84Million barrels per day respectively, and states that the average crude oil production represented 92 percent of OPEC quota.

Those figures show a system still fighting for stable recovery. In such a system, contractor liquidity is a production variable. It affects maintenance frequency, intervention speed, equipment availability, safety compliance, crew retention and the readiness of service companies to mobilise without delay.

“This is why NCDMB should treat payment discipline as part of Nigerian content performance. A contractor funded through NCDF, assessed through Nigerian content plans and monitored through compliance certificates should not be left exposed after delivering certified work.”

A country aiming for higher production cannot treat certified contractor invoices as optional paperwork.

The law protects communities. It must also protect production enablers

Nigeria deserves credit for building more formal protection for host communities. NUPRC reported that the Host Community Development Trust had reached ₦373Billion by 13 October 2025, with at least 536 community projects moving at the same time. The fund comprised ₦125Billion and $168.9Million. The regulator also stated that the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) requires oil companies to deposit  three percent (3%) of operating expenditure from the preceding year into a trust fund for host communities.

That policy is necessary. Communities bear real burdens from petroleum activity. They deserve visible benefits, structured funds, project oversight and banked trust money.

The missing protection is for the companies that make production possible. Drilling firms, production chemical suppliers, marine logistics providers, fabricators, engineering houses, inspection teams, maintenance contractors, pipeline support firms, waste handlers, security service providers and indigenous technical companies carry large up-front costs. They fund operations first, then wait.

The current settlement gap creates a dangerous imbalance. Communities have a dedicated statutory route for ring-fenced funding. The state has fiscal collection tools. Regulators have cost, production and compliance data. Contractors, after doing certified work, often fall back on contract clauses, arbitration and private pressure.

That is too weak for an industry of national importance.

Local content cannot survive on unpaid invoices

The Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB) has made measurable progress. The agency announced that Nigerian content performance reached 56% in 2024, rising from 54% in 2022 and 2023, and from 26% in 2016 before the 10-year strategic plan. NCDMB also said it is targeting 70% Nigerian oil and gas spend domiciled in-country by 2027, with projected employment opportunities of about 300,000 Nigerians across oil, gas and linked industries.

NCDMB later announced that Nigerian content level had reached 61 percent by the third quarter of 2025 and unveiled a $100Million Equity Investment Scheme for high-growth indigenous energy service companies. The Bank of Industry also described the scheme as patient capital for Nigerian-owned companies seeking expansion, stronger competitiveness and deeper participation across the oil and gas value chain.

Those gains are worth defending. Local content is built by companies, not slogans. It is built through vessels, machine shops, fabrication yards, welders, subsea capability, instrument technicians, HSE supervisors, project controls teams, training budgets and bank-funded equipment.

When operators delay payment, they do not only hurt one contractor. They attack the industrial base NCDMB is trying to build.

A contractor that cannot collect certified receivables cannot train staff. It cannot maintain equipment. It cannot buy better tools. It cannot retain engineers. It cannot meet payroll with pride. It cannot pursue excellence when survival eats every board meeting.

This is why NCDMB should treat payment discipline as part of Nigerian content performance. A contractor funded through NCDF, assessed through Nigerian content plans and monitored through compliance certificates should not be left exposed after delivering certified work.

The banking system is already carrying the hidden burden

Payment delinquency in oil and gas does not stay inside oil and gas. It enters banks.

Contractors finance mobilisation through overdrafts, invoice discounting, import lines, lease facilities, vessel financing and asset-backed loans. When invoices remain unpaid after certification, the contractor becomes distressed. The bank then carries the risk. Interest piles up. Security values become stressed. Credit committees become more cautious. Good contractors lose borrowing room because bad payment conduct makes the whole trade look toxic.

CBN’s own published Monetary Policy Committee activity page shows banking asset-quality pressure rising through 2025. It recorded non-performing loans at 4.2% in February 2025, 5.6% in May, 5.63% in July, 7.6% in September and 7.74% in November.

Those figures do not isolate oilfield contractor receivables, so they should not be read as proof of one cause. They do show why CBN should treat chronic unpaid oilfield invoices as a financial stability concern. Oil and gas receivables are often large, concentrated and linked to major obligors. When they sour, banks feel it.

CBN has already stated a policy interest in financial-system governance, early warning systems, customer protection, capital buffers and financial stability. Its reform page lists zero tolerance on corporate governance in the financial system, special institutions and products for emerging areas, bank recapitalisation, and early warning systems to monitor systemic risks.

The same logic should apply to oilfield receivables. If banks are funding contractors who fund operators, then unpaid invoices are not merely commercial debts. They are deferred financial-system losses.

What government must change

The Federal Government and National Assembly should create an Upstream Contractor Payment Protection Code under the PIA or through connected regulations.

The code should give certified contractor receivables a recognised status in petroleum operations. Once work has been accepted and certified, payment should move within contract terms. If payment is delayed, automatic interest should accrue. If arrears cross a defined threshold, the operator should face regulatory review.

This is not a call for automatic payment of disputed invoices. Operators must retain the right to reject poor work, inflated claims, unsupported variations and non-compliant delivery. The protection should cover certified and undisputed obligations.

The law should distinguish between valid dispute and payment delinquency. Today, that distinction often gets blurred. Blurring it helps the stronger party.

What NUPRC must change

NUPRC is the natural home for upstream payment discipline because it already tracks production, licences, field activity, host community obligations and regulatory compliance.

NUPRC should require every upstream operator to file quarterly aged-payables schedules covering 30, 60, 90 and 180-day buckets. The filing should separate disputed invoices from certified, undisputed invoices. False classification should attract sanction.

NUPRC should also require majority JV participants, including state-linked partners, to sign payment oversight certificates. Where public ownership exists in a venture, public accountability should follow the money.

A second measure should link persistent arrears to lifting governance. Where certified contractor arrears exceed a defined limit, part of entitlement proceeds should move into a vendor settlement escrow account. The account can be administered by an independent trustee. Payment should follow reconciled age and certification status.

A third measure should connect payment conduct to work programme approvals. Operators seeking approvals for new campaigns should disclose unresolved certified arrears and give a settlement plan. A company that cannot pay the contractors from the last campaign should not receive friction-free approval for the next one.

What NCDMB must change

NCDMB’s mandate already includes building Nigerian capacity. The Board has also reminded operators, contractors and service companies of their duty to remit the 1 percent NCDF levy, and said funds generated under the NCDF are deployed to support indigenous contractors, service companies, capacity development, training, affordable finance and growth across the oil and gas value chain.

That statement gives NCDMB a direct policy basis to act. If the NCDF exists to support indigenous service companies, then payment failure against those same companies must become a Nigerian content issue.

NCDMB should require payment-history disclosure as part of Nigerian Content Compliance Certificate reviews. Operators with repeated certified arrears should face closer review before new Nigerian content approvals. Project 100 firms and NCDF-backed firms should receive priority protection through faster invoice reconciliation channels.

NCDMB should also publish an annual Contractor Payment Health Report. It need not shame companies without process. It can show aggregate data by operator category, invoice age, dispute rate and settlement speed. Transparency alone will change behaviour.

What CBN and financial services firms must change

CBN should create a prudential note on oilfield contractor receivables. It should ask banks to report large exposures linked to certified invoices owed by upstream operators, particularly when those invoices exceed agreed payment terms.

Banks should create approved-invoice financing products tied to operator acceptance. Once an invoice is certified, a bank should be able to discount it against the credit of the operator rather than the weaker contractor alone. That would reduce funding cost for service companies and force better discipline among obligors.

CBN should also support a receivables visibility system linked to credit bureaus and the Credit Risk Management System. Repeated late payment by large obligors should affect their credit standing. Nigeria cannot keep punishing small contractors for defaults caused by bigger unpaid receivables.

Insurers and development finance institutions should be brought into the structure. Payment delay insurance, receivables cover and targeted working-capital products can protect credible contractors while keeping credit risk visible.

Financial services firms also need cleaner lending habits. They should stop treating all contractor receivables as equal. A certified receivable from a financially disciplined operator is different from a receivable trapped with a habitual late payer. Pricing should reflect that difference.

What operators must change

Operators need to stop using contractors as involuntary banks.

A responsible operator should publish internal payment rules, certify invoices quickly, resolve disputes within short periods and fund vendor settlement before discretionary expansion. Finance departments should not be rewarded for cash retention that destroys suppliers.

Operators should create supplier finance desks, not apology desks. They should host monthly vendor reconciliation sessions. They should adopt digital ticketing for field work, digital certification for invoices and escalation routes for aged claims. They should measure payment conduct as closely as they measure production uptime.

Operator boards should receive quarterly reports on certified arrears. Audit committees should test whether delays are genuine disputes or silent treasury tactics. Late-payment interest should be budgeted, not negotiated away by pressure.

The best operators already understand this. A supplier paid on time mobilises faster, prices lower, maintains better safety, keeps better personnel and protects field continuity.

What the public must understand

The public often sees oil contractors as rich companies fighting over big contracts. That picture is incomplete.

Many indigenous service firms are payroll-heavy, asset-heavy and debt-funded. They employ engineers, welders, drivers, mechanics, HSE officers, marine crew, accountants, technicians, community liaison officers and young graduates. Their bills include diesel, insurance, spares, bank interest, statutory deductions, training, permits and equipment hire.

When a contractor collapses, a household loses income. A bank loses repayment. A community loses jobs. A tax authority loses revenue. A field loses response capacity. A young engineer loses career path.

Oilfield payment delinquency is a jobs issue. It is a banking issue. It is a safety issue. It is a production issue. It is a national credibility issue.

The reform package

Nigeria should adopt seven practical changes:

1. A statutory Upstream Contractor Payment Protection Code.
2. NUPRC quarterly aged-payables filing for all operators.
3. Automatic interest on certified, undisputed invoices after agreed payment terms.
4. Vendor settlement escrow when arrears breach defined limits.
5. Payment conduct review before new work programme approvals and major lifting privileges.
6. NCDMB payment-health checks tied to Nigerian content approvals and NCDF-linked support.
7. CBN reporting rules for large unpaid oilfield receivables and bank exposure concentration.

These measures will not make operators weak. They will make the industry serious. 

The final word

Nigeria wants higher production, stronger local content, better jobs, deeper banking confidence and greater investor trust. Each goal rests on contract discipline.

A petroleum industry that delays payment after certified work teaches contractors to price fear into every bid. It teaches banks to retreat. It teaches skilled labour to leave. It teaches entrepreneurs that excellence is punished by bad receivables.

That is a losing model.

The cheapest growth reform in Nigeria’s oil and gas industry is also the most obvious: certify work fairly, pay on time, penalise delay and protect the companies that make production possible.

Pay the contractors. Protect the jobs. Save the banks. Keep the barrels.