IMF And The Example of Botswana - Africa’s premier report on the oil, gas and energy landscape.

IMF And The Example of Botswana

Joseph Stiglitz

THE IMF HAS DONE A GOOD JOB OF persuading many that its ideologically driven policies were necessary if countries are to succeed in the long run. Economists always focus on the importance of scarcity and the IMF often says it is simply the messenger of scarcity: countries cannot persistently live beyond their means. One doesn’t, of course, need a sophisticated financial institution staffed by Ph.D. economists to tell a country to limit expenditures to revenues. But IMF reform programmes go well beyond simply ensuring that countries live within their means.

There are alternatives to IMF-style programmes, other programmes that may involve a reasonable level of sacrifice, which are not based on market fundamentalism. Programmes that have had positive outcomes. A good example is Botswana, 2,300 miles south of Ethiopia, a small country of 1.5 million, which has managed a stable democracy since independence.

At the time Botswana became fully independent in 1966 it was a desperately poor country, like Ethiopia and most of the other countries in Africa, with a per capita annual income of $100. It too was largely agricultural, lacked water, and had a rudimentary infrastructure. But Botswana is one of the success stories of development. Although the country is now suffering from the ravages of AIDS, it averaged a growth rate of more than 7.5 percent from 1961 to 1997.

Botswana was helped by having diamonds, but countries like Congo Republic (formerly Zaire), Nigeria, and Sierra Leone were also rich in resources. In those countries, the wealth from this abundance fueled corruption and spawned privileged elites that engaged in internecine struggles for control of each country’s wealth. Botswana’s success rested on its ability to maintain a political consensus, based on a broader sense of national unity. That political consensus, necessary to any workable social contract between government and the governed, had been carefully forged by the government, in collaboration with outside advisers, from a variety of public institutions and private foundations, including the Ford Foundation. The advisers helped Botswana map out a programme for the country’s future. Unlike the IMF, which largely deals with the finance ministry and central banks, the advisers openly and candidly explained their policies as they worked with the government to obtain popular support for the programmes and policies. They discussed the programme with senior Botswana officials, including cabinet ministers and members of Parliament, with open seminars as well as one- to-one meetings.

Part of the reason for this success was that the senior people in Botswana’s government took great care in selecting their advisers. When the IMF offered to supply the Bank of Botswana with a deputy governor, the Bank of Botswana did not automatically accept him. The bank’s governor flew to Washington to interview him. He turned out to do a splendid job. Of course, no success is without blemishes. On anther occasion, the Bank of Botswana allowed the IMF to pick somebody to be director of research, and that turned out, at least in the view of some, to be less successful.

The differences in how the two organizations approached development were reflected not just in performance. While the IMF is vilified almost everywhere in the developing world, the warm relationship that was created between Botswana and its advisers was symbolized by the awarding of that country’s highest medal to Steve Lewis, who at the time he advised Botswana, was a professor of development economics at Williams. (He later became president of Carleton College.) The vital consensus was threatened two decades ago when Botswana had an economic crisis. A drought threatened the livelihood of the many people engaged in raising cattle and problems in the diamond industry had put a strain on the country’s budget and its foreign exchange position. Botswana was suffering exactly the kind of liquidity crisis the IMF had originally been created to deal with; a crisis that could be eased by financing a deficit to forestall recession and hardship. However, while that may have been Keynes’s intent when he pushed for the establishment of the IMF, the institution does not now conceive of itself as a deficit financier, committed to maintaining economies at full employment. Rather, it has taken on the pre-Keynesian position of fiscal austerity in the face of a down-turn, doling out funds only if the borrowing country conforms to the IMF’s views about appropriate economic policy, which almost always entail contractionary policies leading to recessions or worse. Botswana, recognizing the volatility of its two main sectors, cattle and diamonds, had prudently set aside reserve funds for just such a crisis. As it saw its reserves dwindling, it knew that it would have to take other measures. Botswana tightened its belt, pulling together, and got through the crisis. But because of the broad understanding of economic policies that had been developed over the years and the consensus-based approach to policy making, the austerity did not cause the kinds of ‘cleavages in society that have occurred so frequently elsewhere under IMF programmes, Presumably, if the IMF had done what it should have been doing providing funds quickly to countries with good economic policies in times of crisis, without searching around for conditionalties to impose — the country would have been able to wend its way through the crisis with even less pain (The IMF mission that came in 1981, quite amusingly, found it very difficult to impose new conditions, because Botswana had already done so many of the things that they would have insisted upon.) Since then, Botswana has not turned to the IMF for help.

The assistance of outside advisers independent of the international financial institutions had played a role in Botswana’s success even earlier. Botswana would not have fared as well as it did if its original contract with the South African diamond cartel had been maintained. Shortly after independence, the cartel paid Botswana $20 million for a diamond concession in 1969, which reportedly returned $60 million in profits a year. In other words, the payback period was four months! A brilliant and dedicated lawyer seconded to the Botswana government from the World Bank argued forcefully for a renegotiation of the contract at a higher price, much to the consternation of the mining interests. Dc Beers (the South African diamond cartel) tried to tell people that Botswana was being greedy. They used what political muscle they could through the World Bank, to stop him. In the end, they managed to extract a letter from the World Bank making it clear that the lawyer did not speak for the Bank. Botswana had the opportunity to renegotiate the whole relationship. The new agreement has so far served Botswana’s interests well, and enabled Botswana and Dc Beers to maintain good relations.

Ethiopia and Botswana are emblematic of the challenges facing the more successful countries of Africa today: Countries with leaders dedicated to the well-being of their people, fragile and in some cases imperfect democracies, attempting to create new lives for their peoples from the wreckage of a colonial heritage that left them without institutions or human resources. The two countries are also emblematic of the contrasts that mark the developing world:contrasts between success and failure, between rich and poor, between hopes and reality, between what is and what might have been.

– Excerpted from the book Globalisation and its Discontents. Prof Stiglitz is the 2001 winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics

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